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Abstract
The international relations field knows Pope John Paul II for his temporal leadership in
the Roman Catholic Church, but less is known about his pivotal role in the rise of Poland’s
independent trade movement, Solidarity, and the collapse of that nation’s Communist
government. This study analyzes current scholarship in order to establish the importance that an
individual actor can have within political science, and in doing so, outlines the criteria for
effective leadership. Major texts include Max Weber’s seminal Economy and Society, James
MacGregor Burns’ Leadership, which explores the concept of “transforming leadership,” Fred
Greenstein’s “The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush,”
and Ann Ruth Willner’s The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership. After examining
how John Paul II met this leadership criteria, attention turns to his three papal visits to Poland,
where his efforts created a hospitable environment in an attempt to oppose the Communist
authorities, where Poles felt able to express their grievances, and where change was possible.
Further evidence of the Pope’s significant role comes from analyzing the cooperative relationship
between the Vatican and the United States under President Ronald Reagan. To measure the
U.S.S.R.’s response to the Pope’s efforts, this study turns to Politburo documents, interviews
with major authors and evidence that suggests Soviet orchestration was behind the 1981
attempted assassination of John Paul II in Rome. This study ultimately finds that Pope John Paul
II’s impact was more than religious, that it was political and that its lasting repercussions
included the weakening of the global Soviet empire. The findings provide a basis for further
studying the international role of religious figures rather than merely the role of nation-states.

Introduction
This thesis examines the claim that Pope John Paul II, the temporal head of the Roman
Catholic Church, played a pivotal role in destabilizing the Soviet Union’s political dominance
over Eastern Europe from 1979-1989. To measure the Pope’s impact, this thesis uses as a case
study the Soviet-backed regime that was established in his native country of Poland. The rise of
Poland’s independent labor movement Solidarity (Solidarność) is cited throughout literature as a
catalytic event in the fall of the Soviet Union. The role of John Paul II, however, whom Polish
and Soviet leaders called a significant player in Poland’s anti-communist movement, lacks
scholarly analysis through the lens of international relations. This void produces a skewed image
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of Soviet communism’s collapse, a major twentieth-century event, and this thesis aims to present
a more holistic image.
In this thesis, I argue that John Paul II played an essential role in opposing Soviet power
in Poland and thus across the globe. To justify this claim, I will first argue that an individual
religious figure is capable of uniquely influencing international relations. Since the study of
international relations often emphasizes the interactions between nation-states, it is necessary in
my case to distinguish how a leader distinctly yields power within the nation-state he or she
represents. In his anti-communist efforts, the Pope exercised two interrelated identities; spiritual
leader of the Roman Catholic Church and temporal leader of the Vatican. His victorious
intervention in Poland suggests that the spiritual and political spheres resist separation. For this
reason, establishing the importance of so-called charismatic or “transforming” leadership is
necessary before asserting that a single figure can make a dent upon the international status quo
(Burns 426; Weber 1: 215). Once this point is made, I will explore how the Pope’s leadership
fulfills the theoretical criteria. An examination of the Pope’s specific efforts will follow, with
particular focus upon his partnership with the United States and Solidarity, alliances that were
made in an effort to oppose the communist regime, as well as instances when he directly
intervened in Polish affairs: these events include disputes with the communist authorities when
he was a priest and later archbishop of Krakow, and his three papal visits. This intervention
produced an active rather than dismissive Soviet response, which plausibly includes the failed
assassination attempt on John Paul II in 1981.
This thesis will consider alternative explanations for communism’s demise. Certain
economic factors existed that were beyond the Pope’s influence, including the U.S.S.R.’s failed
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military campaign in Afghanistan, the consequences, both intended and unintended, of General
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, and economic pressure that was related to
military competition with the United States. All things considered, Pope John Paul II played a
major but not singular role in communism’s global collapse. This thesis agrees with the Pope’s
own words: “The tree was already rotten. I just gave it a good shake and the rotten apples
fell” (Bernstein, His Holiness 356). Pope John Paul II’s dynamic personality and anti-communist
efforts impacted global events, revealing historical precedence for a religious leader who
modifies international affairs.

Methodology
Poland is an appropriate case study because it effectively answers the central question:
Did John Paul II’s efforts to weaken global communism produce significant change? The Pope’s
actions were grounded in his Polish identity. He was born in Poland during a brief period of
independence, where he later performed in underground plays and studied seminary during the
Nazi occupation, and ultimately countered Soviet control over the course of three decades. The
Washington Post’s Roberto Suro highlights John Paul II’s strong connection to his homeland and
his personal experience with the foreign occupiers who controlled it. According to Suro, Karol
Wojtyla (he took the name “John Paul II” upon being elected pope in October 1979) was known
to Poland as “the skier, the actor, the playwright, the poet, the man who had lived through World
War II, the man who knew communism” (qtd. in “John Paul II: The Millennial Pope). Without a
life-long connection with Poland, John Paul II would have lacked a personal history with the
U.S.S.R. He may not have fought communism at all. It was in Poland that the Pope concentrated
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his opposition to Soviet domination, visiting the country three times prior to the April 1989
establishment of semi-free elections; in 1979, 1983, and 1987. His personal ties to the nation
ingratiated him with its people. Three million Poles, one-tenth of the nation’s population, greeted
him upon his first arrival to Poland as Pope, in June 1979 (Pleshakov 86). This special
relationship existed between John Paul II and no other country. His national identity defined him
from the start of his papacy, as soon as the College of Cardinals voted him the first non-Italian
Pope elected since Adrian VI in 1522.
The Pope’s impact upon the Communist Party’s global empire reverberated outward from
Poland. Choosing one of those other nations as the case study would have examined the effect of
the Pope’s influence rather than the source. Czechoslovakia was an attractive candidate for the
case study because the Pope directly intervened in Czech affairs as well. When the Church in this
neighboring country was suffering from a priest shortage, then-Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, under the
permission of a Czech bishop, ordained priests for that nation (O’Sullivan 18). John Paul II also
visited Czechoslovakia, but in April 1990. This date was prior to the U.S.S.R.’s collapse but after
the demise of Czechoslovakia’s Soviet-supported government in November 1989. Since by this
time the U.S.S.R. was breaking apart, and the Czechs had already overthrown the Communist
Party’s influence, Czechoslovakia would be an ineffective case study. Lithuania was another
candidate for this study, but its suitability was invalidated by this study’s time horizon and
Lithuania’s tendency to be influenced by rather than influencing events in neighboring states.
Bernstein and Politi note that in Lithuania, which suffered more brutal media regulation than its
southern neighbor, citizens near the Polish border received less censored coverage of John Paul
II’s 1979 papal visit (qtd. in Brown 426-427). Furthermore, the Pope also visited Lithuania, but
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as in Czechoslovakia, the visit was too late to influence the U.S.S.R., whose demise occurred
two years prior.
The time period for this thesis extends from October 16, 1979 to April 5, 1989. The first
date marks Karol Wojtyla’s election to the papacy. On the latter date, Poland’s Communist Party
signed an agreement with Solidarity that legitimized the labor movement as a political party. This
agreement set the stage for the June 1989 elections, which propelled Solidarity into power and
ended Poland’s communist era. I considered extending the time horizon to the Soviet Union’s
official dissolution in December 1991. Doing so would have altered the intention of this thesis,
however, which is to examine papal opposition to Poland’s communist regime and the
subsequent repercussions of this opposition upon the broader Soviet Union. This thesis will not
examine every instance of papal opposition to the U.S.S.R. in Poland during and after the period
of communist rule. There will be references to earlier incidents, however, beginning at the time
of the priestly ordination of the future John Paul II, Karol Wojtyla, in 1946, and continuing
throughout Wojtyla’s service as archbishop of Krakow. During this period, Wojtyla confronted
the communist regime without the top-level leadership that the papacy provided. One incident to
be examined is Wojtyla’s successful attempt in the early 1970s to build a church at Nowa Huta, a
Polish town that was constructed to be a communal utopia where places of worship were banned.
There are surviving records of Soviet opinions about the future pope, and these are useful in
order to trace the development of his antagonistic relationship with the regime. Events such as
these occur outside the time horizon, but they provide necessary secondary evidence for painting
a more complete portrait of John Paul II’s human character.
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Before discussing the Pope’s influence within the context of this study, this thesis will
show that the study of an institutional leader, whether political or religious, is a worthwhile
endeavor in the international relations field. This analysis must occur before the anti-communist
role of Pope John Paul II, a non-structural factor, is discussed. In the likelihood that international
relations theorists emphasize structural factors, it is necessary to defend the assumption that an
individual leader can influence international relations. Only when this point is made can the
thesis move forward. Alternative structural factors are accounted for in the latter portion of this
thesis. Since much scholarly analysis covers these structural factors, it would be redundant to
delve deeply into them. Their inclusion is not to regurgitate old arguments, but to avoid the false
notion that John Paul II single-handedly brought down the Soviet menace. Including these
supplemental factors connects this thesis with the majority of scholarly writing, which tends
towards a preoccupation with structural analysis. The argument that the Pope’s involvement
alone explains the U.S.S.R.’s collapse is as erroneous as the argument that structural factors
alone mattered, and this thesis intends to avoid both pitfalls.
My research for this study initially embraced a mere historical perspective, seeking to
explain a past event with a new twist. Only when my research was underway did I recognize the
theoretical implications of my findings. If Pope John Paul II played an essential role in the
collapse of communism, perhaps another religious leader exerted power elsewhere, with
measurable effects, in the modern day. I wondered what existing scholarship said about an
individual actor’s importance to world events. It was then that I expanded the scope of my
research to include leadership itself, and the power of one man or woman to inspire change. John
Lewis Gaddis, a noted Cold War scholar and Yale University Professor, sparked my interest
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when he trumpeted John Paul II as a major figure in communism’s demise. This was surprising
because nowhere in my academic career, from high school through college, did the leader of the
Roman Catholic Church come up in a discussion about the Soviet Union. Gaddis’ powerful
assertions assumed widespread acceptance of the Pope’s role within the academic community. I
personally knew this was not the case. At this point I realized that a hole existed within Cold War
scholarship. This was not a hole that could be filled with a simple insertion of John Paul II into
the debate. On the contrary, I needed to argue for the inclusion of non-structural factors,
primarily the involvement of human actors, in a discussion about the Cold War. After the
discovery, the next point of business became organizing my findings. As previously discussed, I
have included a defense of individual leadership before the main argument about the Pope. In
doing so, I hope to shed more light on the U.S.S.R.’s final years while substantiating the weak
assertions that even a celebrated humanities scholar such as Gaddis made.
To clarify, “communism” refers to the ideology advocated in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and its Eastern European satellite states. Any reference in this study to the
Communist Party means the political organ that institutionalized communist ideology within the
U.S.S.R. rather than in the People’s Republic of China. The demise of communist influence
mirrors the collapse of the U.S.S.R., its global champion. Concerning the title of the Roman
pontiff, the word “pope” is also used. When this text mentions “the Pope” it means specifically
Pope John Paul II. Lastly, “the Church” refers specifically to the Roman Catholic Church.
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Literature Review
I. Theoretical Literature
The sources are divided into two categories, theoretical literature that focuses on
individual actors’ role within international relations and empirical literature that analyzes the
relationship between Poland, the Pope, and the Soviet Union. Major works within the first
category include James MacGregor Burns’ Leadership, Fred Greenstein’s “The Impact of
Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush,” published in The American
Political Science Review, Max Weber’s Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive
Sociology and Ann Ruth Willner’s The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership. This
literature agrees that individual actors may influence the global status quo, but limits their
influence to varying degrees that are dependent upon suitable circumstances. Greenstein calls
this “the question of action dispensability,” which asks “what are the circumstances under which
the actions of single individuals are likely to have a greater or lesser effect on the course of
events” (633). Even the most captivating leaders are subject to the conditions in which they
operate. In “The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush,”
Greenstein specifies what factors prompt a leader to have greater influence upon political
circumstances and which factors impede such influence. Individual actors that are caught within
the middle ranks of a bureaucratic system, for instance, will be less likely to exude influence
upon the entire system than an individual who is located at the top of the command chain.
Greenstein calls this factor “the location of the actor in [his or her] environment” and includes
along with it “the actor’s peculiar strengths and weaknesses” (634). Therefore, a leader’s ability
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to influence the status quo is not only dependent upon whether the conditions allow him or her to
incite change, but also on the leader’s personal skills or lack thereof.
Elsewhere in the literature, the particular strengths and weaknesses that help or hinder a
leader’s ability are named. In The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership, Ann Ruth
Willner argues that strong leaders have excellent rhetorical skills. She writes that an influential
orator will employ “figurative language,” “cultural symbols [that] ... elicit the emotions” and
“devices related to sound, such as rhythm, repetition, alliteration, and balance” (152). Willner
also states that influential leaders produce a widespread belief that they possess exceptional
qualities and share a strong connection with the people they rule or represent. Followers believe
that the charismatic leader possesses more than exceptional goodness. “In the charismatic
relationship, followers believe their leader to have superhuman qualities or to possess to an
extraordinary degree the qualities highly esteemed in their culture” (Willner 6). Powerful leaders
have followers who believe that the former possess more than simply above-average talent.
James MacGregor Burns sees more practical requirements for an influential leader. True
leadership must tap into shared needs between the ruler and the ruled or, in a democratic society,
between the president and the citizenry. Burns calls this concept “moral leadership,” which is
such that “leaders and led have a relationship not only of power but of mutual needs, aspirations
and values” and “that leaders take responsibility for their commitments” (4). Successful leaders,
those who produce real change, understand where their people come from. These leaders share a
cultural identity and will use this identity to rally the masses. Leaders will promise the masses
that their needs will be fulfilled, that their aspirations will be met, and that their values will be
protected. Such promises, however, are a double-edged sword. Leaders must follow through or
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risk losing their support. Yet this is not the form of leadership that requires the most from the
person on top. This distinction belongs to “transforming leadership,” which is “leadership that
occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers
raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality” (Burns 20). This leadership
produces the most change, if utilized correctly, because it allows for the entire society to
progress. For this to occur, the leader must understand the society’s basic needs and wishes,
change conditions so they are met, and through interaction make the society better in the most
moral sense of the word.
A discussion of political leadership would be incomplete without referencing charismatic
leadership, a term coined by sociologist Max Weber in Economy and Society: An Outline of
Interpretive Sociology. Cited by both Burns and Willner, Weber describes his concept as that
form of “personal authority” which “surrender[s] to the extraordinary, the belief in charisma, i.e.,
actual revelation or grace resting in such a person as a savior, a prophet, or a hero” (3: 954). To
Willner, the source of the charismatic qualities is not as important as the subjects that recognize
such qualities and respond with obedience. In practice, charismatic leadership allows rulers to
construct a cult of personality around themselves in order to demand compliance from their
subjects without resorting to coercion.
One set of circumstances provides a fertile breeding ground for charismatic leaders to
work their magic – crisis. During a crisis, the status quo is upset and subjects want stability. A
charismatic individual is a prime candidate for bringing about stability. Internal violence
especially, if orchestrated by the current regime, creates anxiety and resentment, both of which
are suitable conditions for an opposition-minded charismatic leader to arise. As Willner writes,
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“Apart from the fact that internal violence and terrorism can hinder normal life and livelihood,
even violence and terror directed at specific targets tend to take their toll of others, heightening
anxiety and resentment” (46). Even when the government is rallied around a designated, limited
enemy, the vast majority may experience disillusionment. The crisis is a truly tumultuous
situation, during which people demand change towards peace. But a violent crisis is not enough
for charismatic leaders to swoop in and begin reforms. Burns’s emphasis upon fulfilling social
needs cannot be forgotten. Weber describes the charismatic leader’s burden: “The charismatic
hero derives his authority not from an established order and enactments ... [h]e gains and retains
it solely by proving his powers in practice” (3: 1114). Charismatic leaders will fail unless they
fill society’s wants, which during a crisis is to bring peace. Therefore, in Poland, Soviet
oppression would not suffice for a charismatic leader to gain long-term adherence. Polish society
would expect measurable results, sooner rather than later.
Charismatic and transforming leadership are relevant to the discussion of John Paul II
because it was these forms of leadership that the Pope employed within Poland. Josef Stalin once
expressed his contempt for the Church, asking, “How many divisions does the Pope
have?” (“John Paul II: The Millennial Pope). Besides the Swiss Guard, which provides special
protection for the Pope, there are no divisions. John Paul II, therefore, was limited to using soft
power to advance change. Establishing his ability to garner support through charismatic
leadership is essential to understanding how the Pope used soft power, specifically through
shaming and blaming, to fuel Poles’ anti-communist activism. If an average Pole spoke to
General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the sixth First Secretary of the Polish United Worker’s Party or to
Lech Walesa, Solidarity’s leader and future Polish president, it would mean little. The theory of
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charismatic political leadership suggests, however, that a person in the right position, with the
right perceived qualities and in the proper circumstances may bring about change.

II. Empirical Literature
While the theoretical literature establishes what attributes successful leaders must have,
the empirical literature studies whether the Pope’s exercise of leadership had consequences
within Poland and, in turn, on the Communist Party globally. Principal sources include Carl
Bernstein and Marco Politi’s His Holiness, Archie Brown’s The Rise and Fall of Communism,
John Lewis Gaddis’ The Cold War: A New History, John O’Sullivan’s The President, the Pope
and the Prime Minister, George Weigel’s two biographies of the late pontiff, entitled The End
and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II – The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy and
Witness to Hope, and PBS’s documentary John Paul II: The Millennial Pope. Generally
speaking, the sources agree that the Pope’s intervention was an essential factor in ending the
Communist Party’s Polish rule and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The specific point of
disagreement lies in ascribing credit to the Roman pontiff rather than to other factors. Gaddis
identifies the 1979 papal visit as the trigger that led to communism’s collapse worldwide. In The
Cold War: A New History, Gaddis writes that “when John Paul II kissed the ground at the
Warsaw airport on June 2, 1979, he began the process by which communism in Poland – and
ultimately everywhere – would come to an end” (193). Bernstein provides vast information on
the Soviet, Solidarity and Polish-Communist perspectives towards John Paul II. KGB leader Yuri
Andropov accused the Vatican of “creating a new type of confrontation with the Communist
Party” by abandoning its previous policy that was aimed towards reconciliation with Soviet
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influence in Eastern Europe (Bernstein, His Holiness 388). Such comments suggest that John
Paul II’s Vatican played a large role in weakening communism’s global strength. Archie Brown is
of the opposite persuasion, arguing that Solidarity, though bolstered by papal activities within
Poland, had a limited international impact. In The Rise and Fall of Communism, Brown writes
that “there was ... no causal link between the political achievements of Solidarity at the
beginning of the 1980s and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe at the end of the
decade” (436-437). Other sources, to be discussed shortly, take a moderate approach that ascribes
praise to the Pope without suggesting that he was the magic bullet that killed the Soviet Union.
The lack of peer-reviewed journals that cover the Pope’s anti-communist role is
frustrating, though the scarcity is amended by George Weigel’s two authoritative biographies of
Pope John Paul II, which most other sources, both religious and secular, cite. That so many
varying sources point back to Weigel speaks volumes about the value of Witness to Hope: The
Biography of Pope John Paul II and The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II – The
Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy. Furthermore, Mary Eberstadt writes a wellbalanced review of The End and the Beginning in the Dec. 2010/Jan. 2011 edition of Policy
Review that reiterates Weigel’s dominance regarding the issue of Pope John Paul II, his political
relationship with President Ronald Reagan, and communism. In his article “The President and
the Pope,” published in the conservative magazine National Review, Weigel criticizes authors
who overemphasize the connection between Reagan and John Paul II, arguing that the
relationship was more of support than a coequal partnership.
The sources agree that the United States supported John Paul II’s anti-communist plans,
but as the above tension illustrates, there are disagreements about President Ronald Reagan’s
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personal investment and the extent to which papal activism would have succeeded without
American support. O’Sullivan includes a story that describes the president’s reaction to the 1979
papal visit, during which the then California governor cried. Rather than including such
emotionally appealing narratives, Weigel limits his discussion to factual evidence. Weigel cites
the correspondence between the American president and the Catholic pontiff and intelligence
meetings Reagan orchestrated for the Pope involving U.S. General Vernon Walters and CIA
Director William Casey. In “The President and The Pope,” Weigel criticizes those who argue that
the two world leaders had a secret alliance. “Journalistic fantasists like Carl Bernstein
notwithstanding,” Weigel writes, “there was no ‘holy alliance,’ no conspiracy between President
Reagan and Pope John Paul to bring down the Soviet empire” (23). Instead, Weigel states, the
Pope’s greatest victory was his first papal visit to his home country, made over a year prior to
Reagan’s election. Three million people greeted the Pope in Krakow as part of this
unprecedented nine-day journey in June 1979, which sparked an anxious correspondence
between Yuri Andropov, the Communist Party’s General Secretary, and Edward Gierek, First
Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, and galvanized the majority Catholic population.
Reagan, in turn, held most sway by presenting an economic challenge to the Soviet Union
independently of the Vatican. At the same time, the two world leaders maintained a largely letterbased communication (one dozen letters during Reagan’s first year in office alone). They also
met in Rome in June 1982 and June 1987 behind closed doors to discuss matters related to the
Communist Party’s grip over Eastern Europe. Their interaction certainly strengthened the anticommunist cause through mutual collaboration, but in The End and the Beginning, Weigel is
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careful to emphasize each man’s ability to orchestrate political achievements individually; he
rejects the holy alliance that Bernstein proclaims in his 1992 article of the same name.
The sources also stir debate regarding the nature of John Paul II’s political power, more
correctly stated as moral power with political consequences. Weigel assigns hard power to
Reagan and soft power, exercised through diplomatic shame-and-blame channels, to the Pope.
This soft power was not without efficacy, the authors are sure to note, and contained real,
substantial influence. O’Sullivan highlights the Pope’s ability to command large swaths of the
population simply because of their shared religious, cultural and ethnic heritage. O’Sullivan also
writes how, from his time as a young priest to archbishop of Krakow, Pope John Paul II – then
Karol Wojtyla – defied Soviet authority through his homilies and clever subterfuge, such as
tricking the Polish government into constructing churches that they had originally forbidden.
Constantine Pleshakov, in There is No Freedom Without Bread!: 1989 and the Civil War That
Brought Down Communism, writes of the sheer numbers that were under John Paul II’s
influence. On a basic level, Pleshakov argues, Pope John Paul II was uniquely suited to dealing
with the situation of communism in Poland, because his identity created a personal connection
with a wounded people.
Strong evidence for the Pope’s international role comes from the opinions of other world
leaders and public figures. The impressions made upon renowned politicians who worked
alongside (or against) John Paul II provide first-hand information about the man and his effects,
whether upon political events or upon the minds of his contemporaries. Bernstein’s list of
interview subjects includes former U.S. national security advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski and
Richard Allen, other American officials and diplomats, and Jaruzelski and Walesa. Bernstein also
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includes within his text several sections of Politburo documents. Weigel refers to similar
documents but only in brief citations rather than in large blocks of text. To the misfortune of
current and future researchers, the Russian government has since reclassified many of these
documents. Bernstein thereby does a great service by providing primary source material that
would be otherwise unavailable.
Historical context is needed in order to judge the significance of certain events and
particular individuals. PBS’s “John Paul II: The Millennial Pope” examines John Paul II’s
struggles against the U.S.S.R. and Poland’s historical difficulties. Originally aired as a Frontline
special, “John Paul II: The Millennial Pope” reminds viewers of the Pope’s personal history,
which extended through the Holocaust and the Nazi and Soviet occupations, and particularly of
his humanity and Polish heritage. Wilton Wynn, a foreign correspondent for TIME, recalls the
Pope’s emotional first night during the 1979 papal visit:
The most touching moment of that day was when [the crowds] started singing an
old Polish folk song about the mountaineer who loved his mountains so much but
now he’s gone and he can’t come back ... [T]here were almost tears in my
eyes at that moment to see this man who was so Polish, so deeply rooted in his
homeland and who had to give it all up for the rest of his life, to come and serve
the Church in Rome. (“John Paul II: The Millennial Pope”)
This passage reveals yet another element of the Pope’s Polishness; that he used his connection to
the country he loved to bring about his desired result, the collapse of the communist regime. This
element connects to the previous reference to charismatic leadership, which requires leaders to
understand and utilize their connection with their people in order to fulfill their needs. “John Paul
II: The Millennial Pope” explains more than the Pope’s ethnic heritage; it explains how he was
aware of his heritage, acknowledged and presented it through charisma, how people reacted
emotionally and the actions that such emotional reactions precipitated.
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Whether the Pope mattered within Poland is one question, but another question is that of
scope: Did the peaceful overthrow of Poland’s communist regime, in which this thesis argues the
Pope lent a hand, trigger the demise of the entire U.S.S.R.? The sources, as expected, vary in
their conclusions. Brown asserts that there were regional effects on the Eastern Bloc countries.
Brown is careful to remind readers of how one nation’s act of defiance can spill over into
another. The instance of Lithuanians accessing freer coverage of the first papal visit demonstrates
how verbal, religious-based soft power worked well for the pontiff. As discussed, however,
Brown sets boundaries in which to frame the Pope’s role. Despite John Paul II’s ability to inspire
people across borders, Brown states that there was no connection between the Solidarity
movement and the overall collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Therefore, even if John
Paul II led Solidarity in the place of Lech Walesa, for instance, his actions still would not be the
defining factor in the Soviet Union’s collapse.
In all, the sources conclude that John Paul II’s efforts, strengthened to some degree by
American assistance, quickened but did not necessitate the extinction of communism in Poland
and, through a chain of events, the Soviet Union. Terrence P. Jeffrey is one of the few dissenters,
arguing that the Pope’s role was indispensable. Jeffrey highlights the Pope and President
Reagan’s abilities to bridge the gap between Christian sects and take on a demonized enemy. For
Jeffrey, the combined power of American might and Catholic spirituality was an immense force
against evil. In “One Moment, One Wall, One Truth,” published in the conservative newspaper
Human Events, Jeffrey places Reagan and John Paul II on interdenominational pedestals, united
against the villainous Soviets. Elsewhere, the Pope’s charismatic power – and the divine spirit to
which it allegedly pointed – becomes evident. As Melady and Stebbins write in “US-Vatican
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Relations: 25th Anniversary and a New President, “The intercession of the Holy Spirit lent vast
moral support to the [Solidarity] movement and before long it had swelled to over ten million
people” (59). Melady and Stebbins explicitly center John Paul II’s religious involvement in the
formation of Poland’s first independent trade union while expressing the historic fact that the
Pope’s visit caused Solidarity’s support to skyrocket. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the
economic challenges facing the Soviet Union is necessary to create a balanced view of the
Pope’s involvement. Aiming for this nuanced understanding allows researchers to consider many
factors without writing off Solidarity’s success on a single one.
The literature provides mixed views about alleged Soviet involvement behind the failed
May 13, 1981 assassination plot on the pontiff. O’Sullivan spends much effort explaining the
details of the case, including shooter Mehmet Ali Agca’s background, the implausibility of the
Pope surviving a wound that missed his central aorta by millimeters and, a subject that is most
relevant to this thesis, the search for the ultimate culprit. O’Sullivan cites lengthy evidence from
an Italian parliamentary commission that cleared Sergei Antonov, a suspected Bulgarian agent
who allegedly hired Agca, and the photographic evidence that later placed Antonov in St. Peter’s
Square at the time of the shooting. O’Sullivan’s evidence is compelling and draws from multiple
sources, including Gorbachev’s archives, John Follain’s “Brezhnev Hatched Plot to Kill Pope,”
printed in London’s Sunday Times, and Vasili Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew’s The Sword
and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. Bernstein supplies
information about Agca’s criminal history, his public claims to assassinate the Pope and evidence
against the Bulgarian secret service. This information raises doubt that Agca simply slipped
through the cracks. Weigel focuses less on the possible conspiracy than on the spiritual and

20
personal repercussions that the attack wrought on John Paul II, arguing that the Pope became
more determined to actively support the Solidarity movement following the attack. As Weigel
writes, John Paul II came to believe that the Virgin Mary, whom the Polish king declared “Queen
of Poland” in 1655 after a Swedish invasion was repulsed, had guided the bullet. Pleshakov
provides the historical information regarding Poland’s dedication to the Blessed Mother.
Prior to examining the source information, I assumed that Pope John Paul II’s role in
Poland’s internal affairs was highly dependent upon Reagan’s assistance. Further research,
however, revealed that the Pope had a more independent role. The original expectation was to
find formal, significant interaction and possibly a political pairing-up of the Pope and President
Reagan, with the latter providing the real hard power support. This does not seem to be the case,
however: most anti-communist measures were conducted independently of one another. Once he
became president in 1980, Reagan performed a supportive role concerning the Pope’s anticommunist efforts in Poland rather than usurping the plans that the Pope, having already
conducted his first papal visit, had set in motion. This does not discount the meaningful ties that
were forged: Reagan and John Paul II met twice in Rome and kept frequent correspondence, both
the United States and the Vatican reestablished official diplomatic relations, and confidential
information was exchanged through U.S. General Walters and CIA Director Casey. The U.S. and
the Vatican were sharing intelligence at unprecedented levels, but the mutual goodwill was not a
revolutionary occurrence. According to American consular documents, relations between the two
nation-states had been improving for years. Leo Francis Stock’s “Consular Relations Between
the United States and the Papal States: Instructions and Despatches,” shows that initial contempt
from the Americans gave way to amicable professionalism. Authors tend to exaggerate the
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personal relationship between Ronald Reagan and John Paul II, who met only twice, while
evidence suggests that the diplomatic pairing was merely a mutually-beneficial acquaintance
surrounding shared interests, not a world-changing marriage between America and the Church.
Each understood the contributions the other could bring and agreed to come together as means to
facilitate that goal.
This analysis concludes with a look at alternative explanations for Poland’s peaceful,
anti-communist revolution and the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Abraham Brumberg’s “Poland:
The Demise of Communism” focuses on the economic troubles that weakened support for the
Soviet Union. This source also covers Jaruzelski’s attempts to repair the broken economy. Simon
Johnson’s “Starting Over: Poland After Communism” treats 1989 as the year that Poland threw
off the shackles of Communism, though he provides information on private business growth that
started in 1988. Johnson also references Poland’s economic reform measures, which were
modeled after Gorbachev’s implementations. These reforms were initiated between Solidarity’s
political victory in 1989 and the fall of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, after the institution of similar
reforms in Poland.
To examine political intrigue within the U.S.S.R., this study then turns to Amy Knight’s
“The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union.” Knight emphasizes the
subversive actions conducted by the KGB and other conservative Communists who wished to
protect the Soviet Union from Gorbachev’s reforms. Knight describes the alarm these individuals
expressed when they watched the Communist hold on Eastern Europe crumble.
In summary, a careful analysis of the source information reveals that in his three papal
visits to the communist nation and his not-so-tacit support for Polish Solidarity, John Paul II
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rallied his homeland’s majority Catholic population around a common identity. This in turn led to
communism’s collapse in that nation because of the inherently repressive nature of the Sovietbacked government. When a Polish identity was reborn, the die was cast. The Communist Party
could not stop a population that had rallied together. When, in 1989, Eastern Bloc countries
rejected Soviet domination in rapid succession, Weigel writes that “the key figure in creating that
revolution of conscience had been Pope John Paul II” (Witness to Hope 607). The sources may
disagree over how large the fire was, but they agree that the Roman pontiff helped set the fire
that ended communist rule in Poland and thereby weakened it worldwide. Having thus reviewed
the existing literature, this thesis now moves towards a close analysis of the pontiff’s role in the
hopes of contributing to current scholarship.

Research Analysis
I. The Theoretical Basis for Studying Charismatic or “Transforming” Leadership
The first stage of our analysis inspects the qualities of effective leadership, beginning
with those listed in Max Weber’s Economy and Society. This significant text - the common
source for theoretical writing on leadership - outlines three means by which political leaders
maintain legitimate authority. The first means is legalism, in which enumerated rules raise an
individual above the rest to a commanding position. The second authority is that of tradition; in
this case, authority is granted according to traditions. To an extent the Church’s ecclesiastic
hierarchy fits under this category through its rule-based selection of the pope. There are 125
current voting members in the College of Cardinals, each chosen by the existing pope to elect the
next successor to St. Peter. After a pope’s death, the Cardinals hold a private conclave where they
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choose the next pope through a series of ballots. Through this system, Pope John Paul II rose to
hierarchical power, but his temporal power had little influence upon the Poles. He had no
political authority to exert. He could preach, but there was no means of demanding obedience
through the threat of sanctions. Poles had a choice to listen to him or not; whichever they chose,
they would not be punished. Instead, they looked to him as an inspiring moral figure. As a result,
Weber’s final means of maintaining power, through charisma, is most relevant to our study. As
touched upon earlier in this thesis, obedience to this leader type is based upon popular admiration
of “exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character,” which are qualities that are deemed
“not accessible to the ordinary person” but instead granted from Heaven to extraordinary people
(Weber 1: 215, 241-242). Historically speaking, these individuals were considered heroes,
prophets, magicians or those with tremendous skill. They acquired power because their
exceptionalism distinguished them from the rest of the community.
European history is familiar with charismatic authority. The Divine Right of Kings
justified the legitimacy of monarchies until the twentieth century, when powerful individuals
became the most visible examples of charismatic leadership. The word “charisma” came from a
Christian term meaning “gift of grace,” derived from the religious concept that God bestowed
individuals with the capacity to perform skills, spiritual and otherwise (Weber 1: 216). In
Western Europe, a Christian monarch was therefore believed to rule through grace, or
“charisma,” granted by God. In the seventeenth century, James I of England and French king
Louis XVI emphasized this concept by which monarchs governed with divine right. Growing
nationalist and democratic movements weakened this theory over time. In the twentieth-century,
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Italian fascist Benito Mussolini and German chancellor Adolf Hitler developed cults of
personality around themselves with which to rally support.
For the modern conceptual definition, Weber cites Rudolph Sohm’s Kirchenrecht, first
published in 1892. In this work, Sohm defines charisma as didactic yet non-intellectual. “Sohm’s
charismatics,” writes Peter Haley, “teach the word of God: commands, not intellectual assertions
about the world (qtd. in Weber 1: 193). Related to orders rather than the proposition of
interpretations, charisma, exercised in the political arena, existed within an autocratic context.
Charismatic leadership was distinctly Christian before the “post-Christian” Weber, Sohm argues,
“emptied the idea, the gift of grace, first of its Christian meaning, finally of all religious
content” (Haley 196-197). Weber enlarged charisma’s scope to include all seemingly
superhuman qualities that marked an individual as a suitable leader, whether in a religious or
secular institution. For a contemporary analysis, therefore, the concept can be said to encompass
indelible qualities, traditionally viewed as exceptional, that are present within true leaders. From
these qualities, leaders solidify their authority over the political system they command.
From both a religious and merit-based perspective, John Paul II was endowed with the
talent to incite reform. Yes, he occupied a top-level position within the Church, but the Throne of
Peter does not guarantee success. Pope Pius IX discovered this lesson when secular Italian troops
easily dispatched the papal armies in 1870, confining him to the one-square mile that now
comprises Vatican City. David M. Armstrong, U.S. consul to the Papal States from April 1869 to
September 1870, describes the pontiff in his temporal defeat: “No one could imagine a greater
fall than his, no greater contrast between the arrogant, infallible Pope of yesterday, and the weak,
deserted old man of to day [sic.]” (Stock 359). Contempt aside, Armstrong makes an important

25
point: being the leader of the Roman Catholic Church does not ensure victory as a leader. Pope
John Paul II possessed qualities that were suitable to fostering positive diplomatic and, more
generally, interpersonal relations. American journalist Eric Margolis, now writer for The
Huffington Post, labels him “a vibrant, macho personality” and “a man who wasn’t the soft
Italian priest who’d come out of the perfumed shadows of a church somewhere” (qtd. in “John
Paul II: The Millennial Pope”). Elected at the age of 58, he was the youngest pope since Pius IX.
He was particularly popular among the Catholic youth, who affectionately nicknamed him “JP2.”
The Pope drew enormous crowds, including “the single largest crowd in world history of
4,000,000 in the Philippines ... [and] 2,000,000 youth in September, 2000, for the World Youth
Day Mass in Rome” (Gregory 270). The event in the Philippines demands attention. The largest
gathering in human existence occurred not for purposes of fighting a war or honoring a nationstate but for celebrating the Church and greeting the person who was its ecclesiastical leader: that
man was John Paul II.
Numerous accounts depict John Paul II as a person of incredible strength, integrity and
rhetorical skill. Individuals both Catholic and non-Catholic, religious and secular were impressed
with him. Cambridge Professor Eamon Duffy calls the pope “a bishop with balls” (qtd. in “John
Paul II: The Millennial Pope”). The non-religious Elena Bonner, a Russian human rights activist
and the wife of Andrei Sakharov, a Soviet nuclear physicist and high-profile defector to the
United States, met the Pope in December 1985. Leaving the meeting, she exclaimed, “He’s the
most remarkable man I’ve ever met. He is all light, he is a source of light” (Weigel, The End and
the Beginning 169). John Paul II did far more than impress: he achieved what Burns calls
“transforming” leadership, as defined in the literature review. When transforming leadership is
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correctly performed, it “raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader
and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both” (Burns 20). The people’s goal is not only
met, but their leader achieves success in such a way that none remains the same; all involved
become better. According to Richard Allen, Reagan’s first national security adviser, the former
president believed that “this pope would change the world” (Bernstein, His Holiness 270). On
the night of the Pope’s death, ABC News reported that tens of thousands had gathered in St.
Peter’s Square to mourn him. The same news report quoted former President Bill Clinton, who
upon hearing of the Pope’s passing said, “In speaking powerfully and eloquently for mercy and
reconciliation to people divided by old hatreds and persecuted by abuse of power, the Holy
Father was a beacon of light not just for Catholics, but for all people.” Indeed, Pope John Paul II
was an influential figure who was internationally renowned for his positive influence upon
global affairs. Within the Church hierarchy, there was no administrative authority higher than the
Throne of St. Peter. John Paul II had the location from which to bring about much change and he
had the abilities to do just that.
Having established the relationship between charisma and leadership capacity, we must
explore what circumstances restrict or encourage a leader’s ability to influence political issues.
Whether or not a leader exhibits charismatic qualities is one such circumstance, categorized as a
political actor’s “peculiar strengths or weaknesses” (Greenstein 634). In the overview of “The
Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush,” this thesis discussed
how an individual’s position within the bureaucratic middle ranks will stunt any attempt at
influencing the system. Instead, the person serves as a cog in the institution’s wheel. Causal
sequences also suppress the impact of a single individual’s action or “restructuring” (634). An
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actor entering the scene in the midst of a political chain reaction will have a limited impact,
because multiple factors are already at work. For instance, Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip
would have produced less impact on the world stage had he attempted to kill Austro-Hungarian
Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the middle of a global war. Instead, political timing was such that
the assassination upset international power alliances, which catapulted the world towards war.
Greenstein notes that a political environment’s malleability is also determined by the presence of
sanctions. Individuals may be less likely to oppose a regime, for instance, if there is the threat of
arrest or death. “The impact of personal differences on behavior,” Greenstein writes, “ is
increased to the degree that sanctions are not attached to certain of the alternative possible
courses of behavior” (638). Greenstein’s last factor is the emotional connection that an individual
actor has towards the place where he or she plans to exert authority. The stronger the emotional
bond, the more likely a person will have an impact.
These sources have demonstrated the importance of charismatic, or, as Burn writes,
“transforming” leadership, as well as the conditions under which such authority will influence
international matters. The next step is to analyze whether Pope John Paul II exercised these
forms of leadership and met their aforementioned criteria.

II. Pope John Paul II’s Exercise of Charismatic or “Transforming” Leadership
To review, this thesis focuses on the time period between October 16, 1979 and April 5,
1989 (for more information, please see the methodology section). Nevertheless, we will also
reference events prior to the start of this timeframe, when Pope John Paul II, then Karol Wojtyla,
first interacted with the Communist authorities as a priest and later archbishop. Maintaining such
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flexibility reflects the understanding that though a man may adopt a new name, the personal
qualities that influence his actions as pope took shape years before his election to the pontificate.
These qualities, to be discussed later in this thesis, are essential to an analysis of John Paul II’s
exercise of those qualities that have already been discussed as being suited to an effective leader.
According to Willner’s requirements, effective leaders are rhetorical masters, express
remarkable, nearly semi-divine talents and forge a personal relationship with the people they
lead. This thesis has already touched upon the Pope’s masterful rhetoric. What remains unsaid is
John Paul II’s capable utilization of his talents that reaffirm the bond between him and his Polish
contemporaries, to lift them towards a higher standard. Gaddis describes how John Paul II used
his talents to “expose the tension between what Poland wanted and how the U.S.S.R. was forcing
them to live in a way that denied the Poles’ right to self-determination:
Real power rested, during the final decade of the Cold War, with leaders like John
Paul II whose mastery of intangibles – of such qualities as courage, eloquence,
imagination, determination, and faith – allowed them to expose disparities
between what people believed and the systems under which the Cold War obliged
them to live. (qtd. in Weigel, The End and the Beginning 184)
The Pope attained this exposure through a message that fused nationalist and religious elements.
Catholicism was a major part of Polish identity, and so appealing to one overlapped with the
other. As Bernstein writes, “For one thousand years the Church had remained the embodiment of
Polish nationhood through wars, slaughters, partitions, persecutions and conquests” (His
Holiness 3). The Church was a source of permanence and an image of Polish resiliency. Having
lived through some of Poland’s most turbulent times, John Paul II’s struggles reflected those of
his nation. “I think that the Pope feels the collective experience and the collective suffering of the
Polish nation in his bones,” says historian Adam Zamoyski (qtd. in “John Paul II: The Millennial
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Pope”). This collective memory matches Burns’ requirement that “leadership is nothing if not
linked to collective purpose” (3). The Pope knew where his people were coming from, and he
had the skill to remind them of their shared battles and how through hope and faith they could
endure again.
Greenstein proposes that the individual actor must act within a region that is responsive
to change. It is not enough to operate within a familiar region. In Poland, John Paul II became
involved in a tumultuous situation. Violent workers’ protests had occurred in the Baltic port of
Gdansk in 1970 and 1976. Two years later, the Founding Committee of Free Trade Unions on the
Coast was established to urge economic reforms, including higher wages. Strikes began in July
1978, with attention gradually turning towards the creation of an independent trade union
(Brown 427-428). It was into this situation that John Paul II flew in June 1979. Though anticommunist protests had begun, the Pope still had a role to play, rallying the population towards
peaceful opposition. The sheer number of supporters, three million amassing for his arrival in
1979, illustrates his effect upon the population. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency’s World Factbook, based on 2002 data, 89.8 percent of Poles identify themselves as
Catholics and 75 percent are practicing. As O’Sullivan writes, “The Polish Church was able to
call upon the loyalty of virtually the entire Polish nation -- including the workers and excluding
only the [Communists]. That amounted to a highly unstable situation” (17). This instability is the
mark of Willner’s concept of a crisis. The very act of having a crisis makes a society more
responsive to charismatic leadership. In Soviet-era Poland, an oppressed society was searching
for a unifying religious figure, and who better than the highest-profile Pole on the international
stage.
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According to Greenstein’s formula for charismatic leadership, the individual actor must
also hold an influential leadership position within the bureaucratic ranks. This top-level position
increases the leader’s “action dispensability,” as defined in the literature review (Greenstein
633). In brief, action dispensability is the likelihood of an action being either imperative or
superfluous, according to the circumstances. For 26 years, Pope John Paul II served as bishop of
Rome and the pontiff, positions that gave him institutional authority over the Church
bureaucracy. With this spiritual responsibility, John Paul II could canonize saints, publish
encyclicals regarding matters of conscience (including controversial issues such as abortion,
birth control and homosexuality) and, highly consequential to Poland, visit Catholic populations
around the world. The most travelled pontiff in Church history, ABC News reported that he
visited over one hundred countries. This was the most influential podium a Catholic could hold.
Two of James MacGregor Burns’ three leadership criteria remain to be discussed. Burns
writes that transforming leaders must satisfy their society’s needs and wants while improving the
social morality. Regardless of what leaders say they do, measurable change matters most.
“Leaders must be judged not by their press clippings but by actual social change measured by
intent and by the satisfaction of human needs,” says Burns (3). The Pope’s visits to Poland rattled
the Soviets, whose opinions will be discussed later. His first papal visit was historic, marking the
first time a Mass was broadcast on Polish television and revealing the population’s widespread
dissatisfaction with the Communist regime. In an article republished in The Guardian to
commemorate the 28th anniversary of the Pope’s visit, Pick writes, “It is evident that the Pope's
presence has released such deep emotions that the reminder by Mr. Gierek on Saturday of
Poland's strong and special links with the Soviet Union paled into routine insignificance” (32).
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The Pope’s words were not empty. They had an efficacious value that even a secular source was
willing to acknowledge, and repeat decades later.
Besides exercising his rhetoric, the Pope also pursued actions that combatted the
Communist Party, with positive results. Over the years, John Paul II met privately with
Gorbachev, Jaruzelski, Reagan, Walesa, and lesser known figures such as UN under-secretary
general Bogdan Lewandowski. He shared intelligence with American authorities. The Pope
successfully pressured Solidarity against violent protest. Quite notably, his efforts convinced the
U.S.S.R., the nation-state that for decades persecuted the Church, to seek diplomatic relations in
February 1985. Ultimately, Poland’s Communist government was overthrown, the U.S.S.R.
collapsed and John Paul II lived to see it all (he died in 2005). Zamoyski credits the Pope for
reminding Poles that freedom was in their hands:
He suddenly turned up amongst these people and said, ‘Look, don’t be afraid.’
They just looked at each other and there were so many people there and suddenly
people stopped being afraid. It was like the beginning of the end of the Roman
Empire, it was like a pin prick that burst the bubble. After that there’s nothing that
could be done. And that gave the strength for Solidarity and for the destruction of
the whole communist system. (qtd. in “John Paul II: The Millennial Pope”)
A higher moral level was reached: the Polish people threw off the yoke of their intolerant,
oppressive regime without resulting to war.

III. Leadership in Action: The Political Consequences of the Papal Visits
Having shown John Paul II’s legitimacy as a leader, this thesis now moves to analyzing
the Pope’s anti-communist efforts and weighing them against other contemporary factors. The
Communist Party’s response to John Paul II was shaped by years of growing animosity between
then-Karol Wojtyla and the Soviet puppet government in Poland. Communist documents first
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mention Wojtyla in 1967, during an apparently routine evaluation of Polish religious authorities,
made in order to discern their threat to one-party rule:
It can safely be said that Wojtyla is one of the few intellectuals in the Polish
Episcopate. . . . He has not, so far, engaged in open anti-state political activity. It
seems that politics is not his strong suit. . . . He lacks organizing and leadership
qualities. (qtd. in Bernstein, His Holiness 110)
Communists would grow to distrust the archbishop of Krakow. The future pontiff learned to
outsmart the regime. After the Polish government passed regulations that blocked the formation
of new parishes, Wojtyla ordered his priests to perform “door-to-door evangelization,” which
established unofficial parishes (O’Sullivan 14-15). When these parishes reached a considerable
membership, Wojtyla petitioned the Soviet-backed authorities to allow a new church that could
support larger numbers. In Nowa Huta, a state-planned communist town where worship centers
were banned, Wojtyla successfully rallied support for construction of the Ark church. It still
stands today, featuring a steel cross made from, ironically, the Lenin Steelworks. Eberstadt
reveals that “intelligence reports to KGB headquarters ... suggest that between 1973 and 1974,
Polish prosecutors three times considered arresting Wojtyla and charging him with
sedition” (97). In a less confrontational manner, Wojtyla led hikes and kayak trips where he
provided parishioners with guidance on sexual ethics. Communist officials never discovered the
covert evangelization because he wore civilian clothing. Interestingly enough, none of the
couples whom Wojtyla counseled later divorced.
Polish Catholicism’s millennial celebration in 1966 was a pivotal event for Wojtyla. He
saw Paul VI humiliated, forbidden from entering the country despite the pontiff’s reassurances
that the trip was of “purely religious character” (“Pope Chides Poland”). Cardinal Stefan
Wyszynski, the archbishop of Warsaw and a cultural leader of the Polish Church, appointed
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Wojtyla to manage nationwide celebrations in local parishes. This duty earned him national
recognition and the documentary “John Paul II: The Millennial Pope” asserts that he “developed
his political gifts” during this period. No specific evidence verifies this assertion, however, nor
are there reports that tensions escalated between the archbishop and the Communist government
during that year.
An effective barometer of John Paul II’s leadership is the sentiments of his political
opponents. According to Jaruzelski’s interview with Bernstein, the Politburo, the Soviet
Communist Party’s main executive body, ordered an “extraordinary session” within two hours of
learning about Wojtyla’s election (qtd. in His Holiness 171). Meanwhile, in Poland, bells were
ringing in every church to celebrate the new pontiff. Hours later, Stanislaw Kania, the Soviet
overseer of Catholic activities in Poland, was warning Poland’s Soviet ambassador that relations
with the papacy were about to sour: “If you haven’t been on good terms with Wojtyla up till
now ... you can only expect relations with the Vatican to get worse” (Bernstein, His Holiness
175). An ill Yuri Andropov, the Soviet General Secretary, was also fretful. In a letter to Jaruzelski
during Solidarity’s rise, Andropov warns that “the [Catholic] Church is reawakening the cult of
Walesa. . . . In this situation, the most important thing is not to make concessions” (Andrew and
Mitrokhin 540). The Soviet leader refers to the Pope’s supporters as a “cult,” identifying them
with uniquely supporting the individual of Pope John Paul II rather than the Church in a general
sense. Andropov further suggests that the Church, stemming from this alleged personality cult, is
changing its policies towards greater confrontation with the Communist Party. Under Pope Paul
VI, the Church had engaged the Soviets through Ostpolitik, fostering a dialogue with the
U.S.S.R. in order to protect Catholics within the empire and perhaps win small concessions. With
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John Paul II, however, Andropov urged Jaruzelski not to make concessions. Why? From the
beginning, the Soviets expressed wariness. Growing support for the Solidarity movement
prompted this letter. Andropov sees room for an alliance between the Pope and Solidarity, a time
when two separate interests become one threat to Communist rule.
These interests were physically united in June 1979. When John Paul II planned this visit,
his first trip to Poland as pope, he had specific intentions. He would undermine the Soviet
authority, but from personal experience knew that he could not assault it directly. The trip’s
official focus was to “protect the persecuted Christians of the Soviet Bloc and the institutional
church serving them. Rome wanted legal agreements with Communist governments that would
allow the Vatican to appoint priests and bishops” (O’Sullivan 16). Though the Vatican did not
want to antagonize the Soviets, any papal intervention was sure to anger them. Upon hearing of
the Pope’s arrival, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev phoned Edward Gierek, leader of
the Polish United Workers’ Party. “Tell the Pope – he’s a wise man – he can declare publicly that
he can’t come due to illness,” said Brezhnev. Gierek declined, arguing that the trip must go on, to
which Brezhnev responded, “Do as you wish. But be careful you don’t regret it later” (Pleshakov
86). The Soviets understood the repercussions of the Pope’s visit. The very act of stepping foot
on Polish soil would undermine the Communist Party’s ability to regulate the media.
Undermine the Communists it did. Timothy Garton Ash observes that “for nine days the
state virtually ceased to exist, except as a censor doctoring the television coverage” (qtd. in
Brown 42). Over one million pilgrims filled Krakow’s Victory Square for the papal Mass and
address, which was broadcast across the country via radio and television. “We want God, we
want God,” they chanted, leading George Weigel to observe that “a crucial truth had been
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clarified by a million Poles’ response to John Paul’s evangelism. Poland was not a communist
country; Poland was a Catholic nation saddled with a communist state” (Witness to Hope 295).
The Victory Square setting held symbolic power as well. Where the government had held public
festivals glorifying Soviet power, John Paul II led his fellow Catholics in the Mass.
Outside of Krakow, the Pope’s trip had an even greater impact. A June 10th visit to Bowie
attracted over a million pilgrims. Those in attendance included international guests, “two
Hungarian cardinals, a Yugoslav, and three more from the West” (Bernstein, His Holiness 232).
Their inclusion represented the Catholic Church’s transnational power and revealed more cracks
in the Soviet’s regulatory power, which sought to counter Western influence. At the Lenin
Shipyard, the pontiff held Mass for six thousand workers, during which he carried a large
wooden cross to the site of a monument dedicated to those killed during the 1970 strike
(Pleshakov 105). This action signaled the seriousness with which the Pope treated his mission
and his ability to skillfully promote a Polish identity that opposed Soviet totalitarianism. The
physical carrying of the cross showed the Pope’s willingness to symbolically bear the burden of
the Polish people. The narrator of “John Paul II: The Millennial Pope” calls Poland “the
collective incarnation of Jesus Christ.” With this sacrificial gesture, the Pope carried the cross of
Communist oppression just as Christ carries humanity’s sin. At the end of the road there is death
yet hope for rebirth. This gesture captured John Paul II flexing his charismatic authority, rallying
his countrymen together in a spirit of solidarity, “in which individual freedom is deployed to
serve the common good, and the community sustains and supports individuals as they grow into
a truly human maturity” (Wojtyla qtd. in Weigel, Witness to Hope 176). This uplifting, uniting
role created a spirit of cooperation throughout Poland, gathering segments of the population by
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their mutual opposition to the Communists. In this way, Pope John Paul II was a coalition
builder. Brown writes that, following his papal visit, a “coalition of social groups and institutions
– workers, intellectuals, and the Catholic Church, who had never before come together in a
common cause in a communist state, even in Poland – co-operated increasingly
effectively” (427). Though not the single catalyst of Solidarity’s birth, John Paul II certainly
shaped the spirt of solidarity necessary for it to rise.
The impact of this first visit to Poland can be viewed through the lens of May 13, 1981.
While greeting thousands of visitors at St. Peter’s Square, Turkish citizen Mehmet Ali Agca shot
the Pope at point-blank range in the abdomen. The pontiff survived, and the official medical
diagnosis was “a perforated colon and five wounds in the small intestine” (O’Sullivan 66-67).
Agca received a nineteen-year prison sentence and John Paul II famously visited him in prison,
but mystery surrounded Agca’s motives for years afterward. Were there others involved? Was the
Soviet Union behind the attack? The literature does not shy from blaming the Communists.
Timothy R. Stebbins and Thomas P. Melady, the former U.S. ambassador to the Vatican argue
that the Vatican’s support for the Solidarity movement, which “swelled to over ten million
people” following the Pope’s visit, led the Soviets to plan the attack (59). This is not
conspiratorial hypothesizing. Evidence suggests that Melady and Stebbins may be correct. John
Paul II was not without high-profile enemies within the Soviet Politburo. Two general
secretaries, Brezhnev and Andropov, considered the Pope a threat. Andropov, writes O’Sullivan,
“held the absurd and even naive belief that the Pope’s election was part of a Western intelligence
plot to destabilize Soviet rule” (77). The Central Committee approved a plan of action against the
new pope on November 13, 1979. The six-point “Decision to Work against the Policies of the
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Vatican in Relation with Socialist States” deployed the notorious KGB secret police against the
Vatican’s “religious fanaticism” (Bernstein, His Holiness 308). Two years later, the first papal
visit became the Soviets’ nightmare scenario. Not only did the trip rally the population behind
Solidarity, it revealed the Communists’ inability to control massive public rallies. Perhaps the trip
was enough to motivate an already paranoid U.S.S.R. into action.
The search for culpability lasted decades. In the 1980s, an Italian parliamentary inquiry
acquitted Sergei Antonov, the alleged Bulgarian agent whom Agca identified as a co-conspirator.
Agca had argued that Antonov entered St. Peter’s Square with him, but Agca had argued that he
was across town. Evidence for Bulgarian involvement surfaced when the U.S. National Security
Agency discovered that coded messages from Bulgaria’s Roman embassy to the Bulgarian secret
service significantly increased during March and April before dramatically decreasing two weeks
prior to the attack (Bernstein, His Holiness 303). Italy’s defense ministry found a similar increase
in radio traffic from Bulgaria into Italy. In 2002, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi established the
Mitrokhin Commission, named after the KGB member who defected to Western Europe a decade
earlier and revealed then-defunct Soviet spy rings. The Commission cited evidence from French
judge Jean Louis-Brugiere, who presided over an inquiry into terrorist Carlos the Jackal.
According to Brugiere, former spies traced the attack command to the Politburo, under General
Secretary Brezhnev. Furthermore, Magistrate Ferdinando Imposimato cites evidence that Carlos
the Jackal, who received protection from the KGB and East German security forces, the Stasi,
simultaneously stayed at the same home in Sofia, Bulgaria (Andrew and Mitrokhin 639). Then
there is the matter of photographic evidence. A man in the crowd near Agca remained
unidentified until the creation of computer recognition software. The person was then identified
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as Antonov, negating his alibi; nevertheless, since Antonov could not be retried under doublejeopardy grounds, the discovery had no legal significance (O’Sullivan 79-80; Follain).
Criminological technology was too late.
A last piece in the puzzle of the assassination belongs to Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the
former Vatican Secretary of State. According to communication between Casaroli and U.S.
Ambassador Melady, the United States had offered to lead an investigation concerning the failed
assassination attempt, but the Pope declined. As a rationale, Casaroli cited the Pope’s on-going
talks with Gorbachev as justification for the refusal:
John Paul was asking the Soviet leader to carry out reforms establishing freedom
of religion and human rights. . . . He did not want to spoil this cautious Vatican
diplomacy by raking up a grave scandal that principally involved Gorbachev’s
late predecessor Leonid Brezhnev. (Melady)
Cardinal Casaroli’s high-profile revelation expresses more than John Paul II’s pragmatic desire to
solve substantive, current issues rather than rehash old wounds. Casaroli gives away the Pope’s
opinion on Soviet involvement. John Paul II believed the U.S.S.R. was behind the failed
assassination, “the grave scandal,” but sought not to embarrass the very nation to which he was
reaching out.
The Soviet Union certainly had motive to kill the Pope. At least one influential Politburo
official realized that revolution in Poland would devastate the cohesiveness of the entire Soviet
empire and that the Catholic Church was to blame. Defense Minister Ustinov considered
bloodshed “unavoidable” to preserve Communist rule in Poland, and if the U.S.S.R. would not
commit to this “we could lose all the achievements of socialism” (Bernstein, His Holiness 277).
Jaruzelski recalls that Brezhnev was meanwhile blaming the Church:
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He said the Church was expanding its influence and making matters more difficult
in Poland, yet we were giving so many building permits for churches that we were
surrendering to the Church. And the Church, after all, was our enemy, Brezhnev
said; sooner or later it would gag in our throats, it would suffocate us. (qtd. in His
Holiness 274)
Nevertheless, motive is not enough, and Jaruzelski’s words reveal more questions than answers.
Jaruzelski cites Brezhnev’s main anger upon church construction, not the Pope himself.
Regardless of the speculation and circumstantial evidence, a lack of direct evidence threatens to
keep the 1981 incident shrouded in mystery. Yes, the photographic evidence reveals flaws in the
parliamentary inquiry and, considered with the spike in coded messages, supports the case for a
Bulgarian connection. Nevertheless, when the Pope turned down the American offer for an
investigation, he let sleeping dogs lie. This thesis does not seek to prove Soviet involvement in
the assassination attempt. The thesis seeks only to prove the effectiveness of the Pope’s
intervention in Poland and the connection between the downfall of the Communist Party in
Poland and the downfall of the Soviet Union.
Regardless of the suggested Soviet plot against the Pope, that the Politburo considered
him a threat shows how how far his impact was felt, even to Moscow. This effect, and the Pope’s
commitment to reform in Poland, was reasserted with each subsequent papal visit. The second
pilgrimage, lasting from June 16 to June 23, 1983, inspired hope during what was a dark period
for Poles. On December 13, 1982, to combat an alleged coup d’etat by Solidarity, General
Jaruzelski imposed martial law. In the months that followed, “6,000 leaders of Solidarity were
detained; hundreds were charged with treason, subversion and counterrevolution; nine were
killed; and the union was banned. But thousands of others went into hiding, many seeking
protection in churches, rectories and with priests” (Bernstein, “The Holy Alliance”). Despite the
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crackdown, the Polish government allowed John Paul II to make a second papal visit and meet
with the imprisoned Walesa. The Communists would not make this second reunion an easy one,
however. Polish interior minister Czeslaw Kiszczak engaged in childish name-calling during
negotiations with the Vatican’s Jesuit trip planner, Father Roberto Tucci. Refusing to call the
Pope by name, Kiszczak instead labeled him “the man with the big family” and demanded to
know why he “wants to meet with [Walesa] who doesn’t represent anybody in this
country” (Weigel, The End and the Beginning 160). In exchange for the face-to-face meeting
with Walesa, General Jaruzelski convinced the Pope to accept a private meeting, a record of
which was never published. Jaruzelski also blocked the Pope from visiting Gdansk and Szczecin
on the Baltic coast, Solidarity’s birthplace.
Despite the militant political situation and more vocal Soviet opposition, the second
pilgrimage broke new ground. Verifying the KGB’s concern that the Polish government’s power
was weakening, Jaruzelski allowed “large, open-air [Masses] in Krakow and Katowice,” raising
fears of “inflaming religious fanaticism among the working class” (Weigel, The End and the
Beginning 159-160). The Marian celebration, dedicated to the Virgin Mary, embodied a worstcase scenario in the Soviets’ minds and an affront to their ideological sensibilities. Before a twomillion person crowd, John Paul II explicitly called for Polish sovereignty based “on the liberties
of the citizenry” (Pleshakov 132). In the midst of this large-scale religious festival, which to the
Communist Party was a massive public demonstration, the Pope called for a democratic
government, implying the need to oust the current one. Had John Paul II been a Solidarity leader,
Polish authorities could and probably would have arrested him immediately. Because of his
unique position and command of such large numbers, however, he was untouchable. Under no
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other imaginable circumstances could a figure publicly denounce the current political state of
affairs in a communist country. As John Paul II discusses in Spiritual Pilgrimage, immediately
following his speech at St. John’s Cathedral, tens of thousands of Catholic supporters “marched
from the cathedral past Communist Party headquarters chanting, ‘So-li-dar-nosc, So-li-darnosc,’ ‘Lech-wa-le-sa, Lech-Wa-lesa” (qtd. in Weigel 461). The Communists’ worst fears were
coming true: Solidarity and the Church were joining forces, becoming one movement to
overthrow Soviet influence.
Political fallout from the trip was swift. Within a month, Jaruzelski caved under pressure
and lifted martial law on July 21. This occurred despite a furious letter from Yuri Andropov, the
new Communist general secretary. The following December, Lech Walesa received the Nobel
Peace Prize. In his acceptance speech before the international community, Walesa vowed to
defend human dignity from inhuman economic policies. Quoting the pontiff, he urged for the
Communist Party to accept dialogue with Solidarity:
‘Why do the working people in Poland – and everywhere else for that matter –
have the right to such a dialogue? It is because the working man is not a mere tool
of production, but he is the subject which throughout the process of production
takes precedence over the capital’. . . . My most ardent desire is that my country
will recapture its historic opportunity for a peaceful evolution and that Poland will
prove to the world that even the most complex situations can be solved by a
dialogue and not by force. (Walesa)
Though John Paul II was not present at the ceremony, his words were heard. He was not far from
the mind of the shipyard worker whose dedication to peaceful revolution earned him the Nobel
Prize. Walesa and the man he quotes had humiliated the Communist regime and survived to rally
the Polish population around democratic ideals.
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When John Paul II arrived in Poland for a third pilgrimage in June 1987, he discovered a
changed nation. Five months prior, Jaruzelski had met with the Pope in Rome. “There is no
future for the party or the Communist system in Poland,” he told the pontiff (Bernstein, His
Holiness 457). That February, the Soviet-backed government promised to open dialogue with the
Catholic Church. The mood surrounding the new pilgrimage was lighter and more festive. Writes
Bernstein, “Pope John Paul II was cheered by millions of his countrymen as he traveled across
Poland demanding human rights and praising Solidarity” (“The Holy Alliance”). The Soviet
state, once the feared authoritarian regime that Karol Wojtyla had struggled to circumvent, the
government that had squelched the Solidarity movement and arrested thousands of its members,
had become irrelevant. The renewed sense of courage, uninhibited by the threat of sanctions, is
evident in John Paul II’s words to his secretary, Stanislaw Dziwisz. Petitioning for a visit to
Gdansk, denied him in 1983, the Pope delivered an ultimatum: “If I can’t go to Gdansk, I can’t
go to Poland. If I don’t go to Gdansk, I’ll just be an instrument of the communists (Weigel, The
End and the Beginning 172). Needless to say, the pontiff visited Gdansk.
From the first to third papal visit, John Paul II’s presence motivated the Polish people,
shaping an environment that supported those pursuing freedom from authoritarianism. The Pope
undermined the Communist stranglehold over all aspects of Polish identity, its nationhood,
religious freedom and socioeconomic well-being. Ultimately he laid the groundwork for
Solidarity, which defeated the Communist Party in Poland once and for all. Nevertheless, John
Paul II was not without allies. For this reason, this thesis now shifts to examining the Pope’s ties
with the Soviet Union’s rival superpower, the United States.
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IV. The Extent of the American-Vatican Alliance
Before he became President of the United States, then-California Governor Ronald
Reagan watched the TV coverage of John Paul II’s first pilgrimage. In Reagan’s mind, this event
solidified the Catholic Church’s power within Poland. Richard Allen, Reagan’s first national
security adviser and a Catholic, recalls watching the news coverage with the governor:
John Paul was walking among vast, enthusiastic crowds who greeted him not only
as their pontiff but also as their national savior. . . . The regimes representatives,
apart from a ceremonial welcome at the airport, had all but disappeared. Security
and organization for the Pope’s visit were provided by thousands of Catholic
volunteers. At that moment – and for the duration of the visit – the Pope was the
effective government of Poland ... Allen left the meeting convinced that Reagan,
like himself, had seen the papal visit as a first, massive crack in the impressive
facade of Soviet power. (O’Sullivan 91-92)
Once Reagan became president, certain that the Pope’s role could dramatically alter the
balance of power in Eastern Europe, Reagan healed a historically tense diplomatic relationship
with the Vatican. Between 1797 and 1868, the United States had maintained communication with
the Roman pontiff, but assigned no ambassador to mediate. Early America looked upon the
papacy with scorn, opposing its perceived moral tyranny and negotiating solely for trade
purposes. In a letter to the Continental Congress in 1779, John Adams, the future president,
predicted that “Congress will probably never send a Minister to His Holiness who can do them
no service, upon condition of receiving a Catholic legate or nuncio; or, in other words, an
ecclesiastical tyrant which, it is to be hoped, the United States will be too wise ever to admit into
their territories” (Stock xxiii). Interactions between the Americans and Vatican officials warmed
throughout the nineteenth century, however. During Martin Van Buren’s administration, 1837 to
1841, the consul expressed his confidence in the two nations’ “friendly relations” (Stock 25). But
when the Italian government seized papal lands in 1870, trapping the Pope in present-day Vatican
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City, diplomacy with the United States was broken. This lapse coincided with “a period of
heightening anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States spurred by Anglo-Saxon fears related to
the large number of Catholic immigrants from Ireland, France and Italy, who were entering the
country” (Melady and Stebbins 57). President Franklin Roosevelt amended relations, appointing
a special envoy to the Vatican in 1939. Diplomacy lapsed during the Truman Administration, and
continued until President Jimmy Carter renewed the sending of special envoys in 1977. Reagan
continued the resurrected practice until 1984, when the United States and Vatican City formally
established bilateral diplomatic relations. Though relations between the two nations had been
improving since Carter, Reagan’s decision to send ambassadors to Pope John Paul II marked
significant progress from America’s historic treatment of the Catholic Church.
Reagan and John Paul II constructed a working relationship that focused but was not
limited to restructuring the Polish government. The Pope had more influence in altering Poland’s
political situation, having conducted his historic first pilgrimage over a year before Reagan
became president. Nevertheless, the political relationship was mutually beneficial. “Neither the
Pope’s soft-power revolution nor Reagan’s hard-power challenge could have done the job by
itself,” writes Weigel (“The President and the Pope” 24). Evidence suggests that John Paul II
would have dramatically altered Polish politics without American aid, but the partnership with
the United States did accelerate the Soviet-backed regime’s collapse. Before the Communist
government loosened its grip on Solidarity, agreeing to semi-free elections in 1989, the union
movement survived through a secret international network that Reagan and the Pope created.
Bernstein discusses this laundry list of contraband, brought across Polish borders by AFL-CIO
representatives, European labor officials and Catholic priests: “fax machines (the first in Poland),

45
printing presses, transmitters, telephones, shortwave radios, video cameras, photocopiers, telex
machines, computers, word processors” (“The Holy Alliance”). Funds for Solidarity came from
joint work between the CIA and the non-profit National Endowment for Democracy.
The two leaders also maintained consistent communication throughout Reagan’s two
presidential terms, from 1981 to 1989. The first meeting between Reagan and John Paul II
occurred on June 7, 1982. While the two discussed anti-communist strategy, U.S. Secretary of
State Alexander Haig and National Security Adviser William Clark, both Catholic, briefed the
Vatican’s secretary of state, Cardinal Casaroli, and Archbishop Achille Silvestrini about the
recent Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Bernstein, “The Holy Alliance”). This incident suggests that
the diplomatic channels were not limited to Polish politics, but that a general relationship existed.
Following the implementation of martial law, communication became more frequent.
Haig sent Ambassador-at-large Vernon Walters to Rome on approximately twelve visits to Rome,
many to discuss sanctions against the U.S.S.R. Casey used the Vatican as a stop-over point
during flights to Europe and the Middle East. CIA Director William Casey would routinely stop
in Rome on his way to Europe and the Middle East. This communication system ensured that
Reagan and John Paul II, though only able to meet once more, in 1987, remained informed about
international matters, specifically regarding the political situation in Poland.
Despite this seemingly co-equal information-sharing, the United States understood that
the Vatican could respond to developments within Poland quickly and efficiently. According to
Alexander Haig, “The Vatican's information was absolutely better and quicker than ours in every
respect. Though we had some excellent sources of our own, our information was taking too long
to filter through the intelligence bureaucracy” (qtd. in Bernstein, “The Holy Alliance”).

46
According to the Pope’s deputy secretary of state, Cardinal Silvestrini, the Vatican utilized preestablished connections with Church officials to direct information between Solidarity and the
United States. In this regard, John Paul II served as a messenger to the United States, a middle
man in America’s anti-communist efforts.
Both the Vatican and the United States assisted each other in gathering intelligence. Their
strong diplomatic relationship permitted needed supplies to reach the underground Solidarity
movement, allowing it to survive during the period of martial law. Weigel is careful not too
exaggerate John Paul II’s alliance with Reagan. Criticizing Bernstein, who to his defense
provides an exhaustive study of American-Vatican diplomacy during the 1980s, Weigel writes
that “the hard, chronological fact of the matter is that John Paul II did his maximum damage to
the Communist enterprise during his epic first pilgrimage to Poland in June 1979, 19 months
before Reagan became president (“The President and the Pope” 23). Reagan entered the political
scene after John Paul II had motivated Poland’s Catholic population to support peaceful reform.
Returning to Greenstein, a political leader is less likely to influence political events that have
already begun to change. Comparatively speaking, John Paul II had more time, more established
communication networks within Poland and more direct contact with its population than Reagan.
Therefore, Vatican City served as a more influential factor in Polish politics, though American
support cannot be denied.

V. Alternative Explanations
With the greater part of our analysis complete, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the
alternative explanations for the Communist Party’s decline in both Poland and the Soviet Union.
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To be clear, this thesis does not aim to prove whether these other hypotheses are valid, only that
they deserve acknowledgment. The first rival explanation is economic. Financial hardships
significantly weakened communist ideology and made the capitalist West a more attractive
model. The Communist response to Poland’s tepid economic performance was unoriginal and
futile. In 1980, “with Poland’s foreign debt mounting and the country facing shortages that left
millions without coal to heat their homes, the government turned once again to its familiar
formula of wage freezes and price increases,” writes Bernstein (His Holiness 237). The strategy
failed and strikes erupted in July 1980. Opposition groups formed around Solidarity, including
the Workers Defense Committees (KOR). These strikes led to the Gdansk Accords in August 31,
1980, which established Solidarity as a legitimate trade union. Of course, Solidarity’s
honeymoon was short-lived and martial law was imposed the following December. Later in the
decade, Jaruzelski appointed Mieczyslaw Rakowski to jumpstart the economy. His efforts failed,
“inflation continued to soar, productivity declined even further, and patchwork solutions, such as
increasing the import of consumer goods, had to be scrapped for lack of hard
currency” (Brumberg 71). Ultimately the communist system would be swapped for a marketbased economy. This economic unrest does not disprove the Pope’s influence, however, and fits
comfortably alongside it. John Paul II’s first papal visit created a hospitable place for economic
opposition and political opposition as well, once the population realized that the Communists
could not fight the Poles’ numerical advantage. Furthermore, he raised their spirits and provided
hope, so they would one day take to the streets believing change was possible. Other nations, in
turn, saw Poland’s peaceful transition towards democracy and followed suit.
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Broader economic troubles within the U.S.S.R. likely contributed to its downfall. War in
Afghanistan sapped the Soviets Union’s financial coffers while the empire was desperately
competing against American military expansion. In 1986, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev
instituted pro-market reforms. Poland adopted similar reforms in January 1990, and results were
positive. In the Harvard Business Review, Johnson reports that “the number of private business
corporations [had] increased [in Poland] from 1,275 in 1988 to 11,693 at the end of 1989, 33,239
at the end of 1990, and 45,077 by the end of 1991” (54). Entrepreneurs formed businesses in
record numbers in Poland and Russia alike, improving economic freedom but undermining the
Soviet command structure. Better economic opportunities and a healthier business climate
spelled disaster for the Communist Party, which saw momentum swift from its stagnant ideology
to capitalism’s thriving cure.
Internal discord is another plausible explanation for the U.S.S.R.’s collapse. Hardliners,
including top-level members of the KGB, looked with horror as Eastern Europe pursued
independence. Meanwhile, capitalist reforms were weakening centralized power. These fervent
Communists blamed Gorbachev, and in 1990 the KGB began plotting against him. According to
Knight, KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov sabotaged the general secretary that same year, “feeding
Gorbachev with alarming disinformation and secretly arranging for the use of force in areas like
the Baltics” (67). On June 12, 1991, the reform-minded Boris Yeltsin was elected Russian
president. Five days later, the concerned Soviet prime minister, Valentin Pavlov, warned officials
of a crisis. He joined seven other conspirators in overthrowing Gorbachev, a failed plot carried
out in August. Though Gorbachev retained his title, he had nevertheless lost his authority. On
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December 25, Gorbachev resigned from office, Yeltsin ascended to the presidency, and the next
day the Soviet Union officially entered the history books.
The power struggle that ended with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. existed not as a
separate factor, but as a consequence of economic turmoil. The battle between the traditional
Communists like Pavlov and reformers was a consequence of Gorbachev’s new economic
policies, which threatened communist power. The reforms were only implemented because of the
economy’s grim state. Therefore, claiming that Communist Party fractures singularly caused the
U.S.S.R.’s collapse holds no water. The economic problem is the most serious alternative
explanation. An economic reason does not invalidate the argument that Pope John Paul II played
a major role in Poland’s liberation from Communist rule and, therefore, in the disintegration of
the Soviet Union. The trail from Dec. 25, 1991 runs to April 5, 1989, which leads to June 2,
1979, though many roads may have led to Moscow on that fatal Christmas Day.

Conclusion
On Nov. 9, 2009, to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall,
German chancellor Angela Merkel led a special celebration. The festivities featured a long series
of painted dominos stretching along what had been the notorious divider between the capitalist
West and communist East. The man who pushed the first domino, which triggered the rest, was
Lech Walesa. On the domino was written in German, “Es begann in Polen,” or “It began in
Poland” (Stadler). In His Holiness, Bernstein includes comments from an interview with Walesa,
who states that “without the Church, nothing could happen” (His Holiness 255). Evidence
suggests that Walesa was right. Pope John Paul II may not have felled the Soviet Union alone,
but using the powers of his charismatic leadership and position within the Church hierarchy
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during a crucial point in Polish history, he set the stage for Solidarity to overthrow Poland’s
Communist regime and trigger a series of events culminating in the U.S.S.R.’s sudden demise.
Pope John Paul II utilized his personal connection with the struggling Polish population,
formed a strong diplomatic relationship with the United States and mobilized support for the
fledgling Solidarity movement. Ultimately, this movement would rise to power, altering the
Polish political structure. In 1989, Solidarity defeated the Soviet-backed regime through the
hard-power political influence that John Paul II, being leader of the Catholic Church, could not
exert. Nevertheless, through his three visits to Poland, the Pope rallied the overwhelmingly
Catholic population with a spirit of hope and optimism, demanding a freer political system for
his homeland. The pontiff was by no means the single catalyst behind the end to communism in
Poland and across the world. Even he could not foresee communism’s rapid disintegration in
1989. As Cardinal Dziwisz relates, “John Paul II wasn’t expecting it. Yes he did think that the
system was doomed to collapse sooner or later because it was so socially unjust and
economically inefficient. But the Soviet Union was still a geopolitical, military, and nuclear
power” (Pleshakov 155). Whether he saw the magnitude of is own influence or not, John Paul II,
through exercising the charismatic leadership he embodied as the Catholic Church’s hierarchal
head and a leading cultural figure within Poland, accelerated the worldwide fire that brought a
superpower’s oppressive reign to an end.
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